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VOLUME VI

MAY, 1937

NUMBER 2

THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN RESPECTING THE
SUPREME COURT
IGNATIUS M. WILKINSONt

AT THE outset I want to thank this Committee for the opportunity of
expressing my opinion on the subject of the President's proposal affecting the courts. Let me also state that the Committee is to be commended for the real public service it is rendering in offering both those
who favor, and those who oppose the plan, a full opportunity to express
their views.
I am opposed to the President's plan insofar as it relates to the Supreme
Court of the United States. My reasons are as follows:
(1) The evidence at hand indicates that the addition of justices is
unnecessary to enable the Court to keep up with its work.
(2) The proposed plan in its ultimate effects will tend to undermine
the independence of the Supreme Court and indirectly of all courts.
(3) The precedent necessarily set by adoption of the plan may be
used at some time in the future to subvert the rights of the individual
and the protection of minorities.
(4) The plan as proposed is not wholly free from doubt as to its
constitutionality.
So far as my first objection is concerned, the letter of the Chief
Justice of the United States, read before this Committee by Senator
Wheeler, disposes of any contention that the Supreme Court as now
constituted is unable either to keep up with its work or to give that
work proper attention. It disposes likewise of the contention that an
increase in the number of justices would expedite the work of the Court.
Actually an increase would retard it. It is obvious that as the numbers
on a Court increase, viewpoints multiply also; and experience teaches
that it takes not only patience but time to evolve a majority opinion out
of originally divergent views. It seems evident likewise from the more
recent discussion of the proposal that age, originally stressed as the basis
for the plan, per se, has little if anything to do with the matter under
Dean, Fordham University, School of Law.
Statement made before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate at
Washington, April 7, 1937, with some additional footnote material.
t
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consideration. The discussion of my next point will make this evident.
My second, objection to the plan is that its ultimate effects will tend
to undermine the independence of the Supreme Court and indirectly
of all courts. It seems obvious at this time that the difference between
th President and the Court has arisen principally out of the Court's
atecisions over the last several years on legislation advocated by the
President and passed during his first term. The Court in its decisions
has adhered to the view that the Federal Government is a sovereignty
of limited powers; that as the Tenth Amendment provides, "the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people." The President contends that the Court's construction of the
powers conferred on the Federal Government is too narrow; and that
the powers granted are much broader than conceded by the Court in
recent decisions to which the President takes exception.
To understand the objectives which the President apparently has in
mind in his desire for Court reorganization, and the interpretation of
the Constitution which he upholds, it will be useful to refer to his
"Fireside" address delivered over the radio on March 9, 1937, and
printed in the "Congressional Record" on the following day at pages
2650-2652. There he is reported to have spoken as followf:
"In its preamble, the Constitution states that it was intended to form a
more perfect union and promote the general welfare; and the powers given to
the Congress to carry out those purposes can best be described by saying that
they were all the powers needed to meet each and every problem which then
had a national character and which could not be met by merely local action.
"But the framers went further. Having in mind that in succeeding generations
many other problems then undreamed of would become national problems, they
gave to the Congress the ample broad powers 'to levy taxes ... and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United States'."
If we refer to the Constitution itself, however, we find that Article
I, Section 8, Clause 1, reads as follows:
"The Congress shall have Power-1. To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and ,Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."
It will be noted at once that the President construes the reference
to the general welfare in this clause as if it were a specific grant of
power separable from the grant of taxing power to the Congress in which
it is contained. Under this construction the Federal Government ceases
to be a government of limited powers and becomes a sovereignty, possessing any and all powers embraced under the broad term "general
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welfare." The President's interpretation becomes evident also fron
the next paragraph in his "Fireside" address which, as reported in the
"Congressional Record" reads as follows:
"That, my friends, is what I honestly believe to have been the clear and
underlying purpose of the patriots who wrote a Federal Constitution to create
a National Government with national power, intended as they said, 'to form
a more perfect union ... for ourselves and our posterity'."
To obtain the construction for which he contends,' the President's
proposal reduced to its simplest terms seeks to create vacancies in the
Court in sufficient number to enable the appointment by him of justices
who will be more responsive to his views on the constitutionality of social
legislation which he may have in mind; legislation moreover which it
seems fair to assume will follow broadly the lines of some of that previously held unconstitutional by the Court. Thus understood, the President's proposal becomes undesirable because dangerous to the continuance of constitutional democracy in America. Certainly if the President
does not intend to appoint justices to the Court whose views are antagonistic to those of the present justices, there is no reason for the proposal.
If, on the other hand, he does intend to secure the appointment of justices who will be inclined to his construction of the Constitution, then
a long step in the direction of destroying the independence of the Court
will have been taken.
It is almost self-evident that it is essential to the continuance of a
constitutional democracy for the judiciary to be completely independent
of both the executive and legislative powers of the government. Indeed
this thought is well expressed by the great John Marshall, who in the
debates in the Virginia Convention, 1829-1831, page 616, is quoted as
follows:
"Advert, Sir, to the duties of a judge. He has to pass between the government and the man whom that government is prosecuting; between the most
1. It is well to bear in mind that this interpretation of the Constitution is not
authoritative. In United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 64 (1935) Justice Roberts in the
majority opinion said: "The clause thought to authorize the [AAA] legislation . . .
confers upon the Congress power 'to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States . . .

'

It is not contended that this provision grants power to regulate

agricultural production upon the theory that such legislation would promote the general
welfare. The Government concedes that the phrase 'to provide for the general welfare'
qualifies the power 'to lay and collect taxes.' The view that the clause grants power
to provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been
authoritatively accepted. Mr. Justice Story points out that if it were adopted 'it is
obvious that under color of the generality of the words, to 'provide for the common
defence and general welfare,' the government of the United States is, in reality, a government of general and unlimited powers, notwithstanding the subsequent enumeration
of specific powers.' The true construction undoubtedly is that the only thing granted
is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation's debts
and making provision for the general welfare."
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powerful individual in the community and the poorest and most unpopular.
It.is of the last importance, that in the exercise of these duties, he should observe the utmost fairness. Need I press the necessity of this? Does not every
man feel that his own personal security and the security of his property
ilepends on that fairness? The judicial department comes home in its effects
to every man's fireside: it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his
all. Is it not, to the last degree important, that he should be rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him
but God and his conscience?"
And we find in number 78 of "The Federalist" the following significant
statement on judicial independence:
"The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount
to nothing."
Independent courts, then, are the last bulwark of the citizen, where
his rights reserved to him by the Constitution come in conflict with the
power of governmental agencies.
In this connection, if we look abroad we find about us in the world
today numerous examples of centralization of the powers of government
in one man or in a small group of men. In every instance, if the situation in these countries is examined, it will be found that the courts are
subservient to the executive power. The most significant result in all
of these countries of the submersion of democratic rule has been the
substantial disappearance in them of any rule by law and the advent
of a rule by men. In fact out of all political movements of this kind
we find that there appears a uniform phenomenon-the greater the degree of personal government the less the degree of supremacy of law.
We are thankful that in America these conditions do not exist. Because
we are thankful, however, we must be perpetually on our guard lest
the beginning of a breakdown in the system of checks and balances
designed by the Fathers of the Constitution may lead ultimately to just
such conditions in this country. While it may be conceded that the legislation the President has in mind is intended entirely for the general
welfare, and therefore valid under his construction of the Constitution,
nevertheless his plan contemplates a material change in the personnel of
the Supreme Court because of its disagreement with this construction.
It is submitted that the precedent set, if the President's plan be adopted,
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would be neither wise nor safe in a democracy. Certainly it would
warrant a further increase in the size of the Supreme Court every time
there arose a clash between the executive and the judiciary in the
matter of interpreting the Constitution. The President himself invokes
in his message the precedents established in the past, where for various
reasons there have been changes in the number of justices composing
the Court. Who can guarantee that a successor will not point to his
example? Of course it has been argued that reactionaries would have
no occasion to change the personnel of the Court. Mr. Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, for example, called
on behalf of the proponents of the President's plan, is quoted as having
said, "If the conservatives have a President and a Congress, they have
all they need, because their policy is to maintain the status qw."2
This clearly overlooks the fact that a really conservative or reactionary administration is likely to pass all kinds of restrictive laws interfering with the freedom of the citizen and the rights of minorities. Indeed such laws are typical of reactionary administrations of the extreme
type. We should keep in mind also the fact which many people forget,
that popular sentiment can change rapidly in a democracy. Just as
the liberalism of Wilson was succeeded by the so-called reactionary
tendencies of Harding, so in the future some other President may be
elected with entirely changed ideas as to what the country's welfare
demands.
Another bad effect of the plan is the subservient attitude of mind
which it necessarily will tend to engender in all judges. Some of those
supporting the plan discuss it as if it would affect only the so-called
conservative members of the judiciary. This is not so. Its effects cannot be limited to any particular group. The attack really is against the
Supreme Court as an independent institution. It seems to be of little
moment that a unanimous decision was rendered by this body in a given
case if the declaration of unconstitutionality held in check the full sweep
of executive and legislative programs. The real objection to the attitude
of the Supreme Court on the part of many people supporting the plan
is not alone that the position of the Court is a departure from the true
meaning of the Constitution in construing, for example, the general welfare clause, but rather that the judicial views in question are unpopular
and out of step with the times. Here is found one of the latent but
none the less real objections to the plan. If the Supreme Court is to
be made to respond always to the prevalent sentiment of the moment,
ultimately it must become wholly subservient to the pressure of public
opinion. This is not to contend, of course, that the Supreme Court
2. N. Y. Times, March 12, 1937, p. 9, col. 6.
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should take no account of social changes and economic disruptions.
Far from it. To take these factors into account is one thing, ,however.
To make them absolutely controlling is another. Mr. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, one of the great liberal jurists of all time, adverts
to the danger of the popular clamor overawing the courts in the famous
case of Northern Securities Company v. United States.' He there wrote
in his dissenting opinion:
"Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great,
not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals
to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise
a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend."
Nor will the effect of attacks on the independence of the judiciary
be limited to our highest court. In their remote ramifications they will
ultimately spend their force against all courts in America. At the. moment the criticism may be centered on the Supreme Court, but ultimately
the effect of this criticism may flare up in judicial chambers in New
York, Chicago, Atlanta or San Francisco.
This brings me to my third point. Much of the discussion in support
of the proposal seems to assume that the principal clauses of the Constitution affected by it are the commerce clause, the due process clauses
qs applied to social legislation, and the general welfare clauses. In fact,
all of the Constitution from the preamble at the beginning to the Twentyfirst Amendment at the end inevitably is affected by the President's
plan. It is obvious that if new meanings and broader meanings may be
fi6ai into some of the clauses of the Constitution the same process can
be applied to every other part of that document. It may be granted that
economic and social problems of the day may center attention on the
commerce, due process and general welfare clauses, but the fact remains
that there are other clauses equally important, where the protection of
the liberties of the citizen and the rights of minorities are concerned.
There are, for example, the first ten amendments to the Constitution
adopted shortly after the Constitution itself was ratified and known
commonly as the Bill of Rights, limiting Federal power over the citizen,
and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment limiting State power.
fierein' are to be found the guarantees of the individual to freedom of
ieligion; of speech; of the press; the right of petition; and that he shall
not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process
of law.
There are many decisions of the Supreme Court where we find it
3.

193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904).
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standing as the sole guardian of persons, often poor and insignificant
in themselves, whose natural rights enunciated in the Declaration of
Independence and guaranteed them by the Constitution, were in danger
of being destroyed because of an objective which was thought to be
desirable by a majority. I need instance only a few of these as typical,
There is the case of Meyer v. Nebraska.4 In that case the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a state statute passed in 1919 in a period
of post-war hysteria, which made it a crime to teach any subject to
any person in any language other than the English language. There
is also Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' in which a statute initiated by a
majority of the voters in the State of Oregon, compelling parents to send
their children between the ages of eight years and sixteen years only
to public schools, was held unconstitutional. The reasons for this were
the limitations provided by the Fourteenth Amendment on the police
power and interference with the liberty of the parent to control within
reasonable limits the education of his offspring. There is also the wellknown case of Powell v. Alabama,0 popularly kfown as the Scottsboro
case. Here action of the Supreme Court was necessary to set aside the
conviction of a negro, charged with rape, which conviction was had in
the courts of Alabama, because the Supreme Court found he had been
denied his right to be represented by diligent counsel.
There is also Grosjean v. American Press Company1 where the Supreme Court held invalid a Louisiana statute passed in the Huey Long
regime which was found to interfere with freedom of the press through
misuse of the power of taxation. Indeed, as recently as January 4, 1937,
there is the case of De Jonge v. Oregon.8 There the protection of the
Supreme Court was extended to an avowed Communist because the
Court found that his right to participate in a peaceable assembly
had been infringed. These are the kind of cases which make it evident
that the instances in which the rights of the individual are challenged by
government, state or federal, are not as infrequent as might be supposed.
Whenever they occur it is vital to the individual or the member
of a particular minority whose rights guaranteed by the Constitutiod
are infringed, that he be able to take his case to a court which will
stand completely disinterested as between him on the one band and the
government on the other. The great liberal, Woodrow Wilson, once
pleaded that we make the world safe for democracy. It is now in order
to point out the importance not only of keeping America safe for denocracy, but also of keeping America safe for minorities.
4. 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
5. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
6. 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
7. 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
8. 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937).
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If today "open-minded justices," as they have been described by some
proponents of the plan, are to be appointed through the process of
enlarging the court, to interpret broadly those clauses of the Constitution
involved in a program of social legislation; if the provisionsof Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution authorizing the Congress to levy taxes,
to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States are to be construed as a broad grant of power
to do anything which promotes the general welfare, then in the years
to come-mark you well-the same means can be used to take away
freedom of the press, freedom of religious worship and the most sacred
rights guaranteed to the individual.
This brings me to my fourth point, that the proposal in its present
form, when it is considered in all its ramifications and objectives, is not
wholly free from doubt as to its constitutionality. While there has been
no affirmative statement that the plan proposed is unconstitutional, there
have been commentators who have described it as unconstitutional politically. I do not state that the Supreme Court plan is unconstitutional,
but I feel that the gravity of the issue warrants directing the attention
of this Committee to the question which as it seems to me should be
further explored. Let me read at this point Article III, Section 1, of the
Constitution, the judicial Article of the Constitution, providing as
follows:
"Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall,
'at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office."
It will be noted that there is no express provision in it conferring on the
Congress the power to fix the numbers of justices composing the Supreme
Court. It does expressly prohibit, however, any interference with the
tenure or the compensation of a justice during his continuance in office.
In considering this point it should be borne in mind that nothing exactly
like the President's plan has been attempted in the past. It may be
conceded at once that the Congress has the undoubted power to increase
the number of justices composing the Supreme Court. In the past their
number has been changed by Congress from time to time. But it must
be conceded also that the forced retirement of a judge, whatever his
age, during good behavior, is unquestionably unconstitutional without
an amendment. The present bill pending before this committee does not
provide for an outright increase in the number of justices composing
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the Court. In fact, as the President has pointed out, it will not necessarily result in any increase in number at all. Herein it differs materially
from past changes made in the number composing the Court. Briefly
it may be said to provide that for every justice on the Court who has
attained the age of seventy years and who does not elect to retire under
the provisions of the bill within six months thereafter, the President
shall appoint subject to confirmation in the usual way by the Senate
an additional justice, provided that in no event shall the total number
of justices on the Court exceed fifteen. This number seems to have
been arrived at by reason of the fact that six justices of the present
Court will come under the provisions of the bill. It is clear then that
this is not an absolute and unconditional enlargement of the Court at all.
It is rather an enlargement on a condition, and a condition which colors
and characterizes and gives definite purpose to the whole plan. In other
words, it is enlargement unless... ! The opportunity is given the justice
over seventy to retire, and it may be said that such a retirement is
voluntary in a certain sense. However, the condition provided for continuance on the Court is the appointment of a younger justice to sit with
the older man during his service on the Court thereafter. Thus there
will be set up a system of judicial "pairs" (if I may use an expression
familiar to the members of this Committee) in which the new appointee
would tend to offset the voting power of the older member. Senator
Glass has referred to the new justices who would be appointed under
the plan, as "wet nurses." Whether there be agreement in this characterization or not, it seems that it is an apt expression to epitomize the
relationship between the new and the old justices. It seems clear, therefore, that fundamentally the operation of the plan aims to work an ouster
by making uncomfortable, if not vexatious, the continuance on the Supreme Court of justices who-let it always be borne in mind-under
the Constitution are given life tenure conditioned only upon good behavior. On the other hand, if a justice over seventy elects to remain on
the bench, his right to hold office, which includes necessarily the right
to vote effectively on matters coming before the Court, would tend to
be offset by the vote of the younger man.
It seems that throughout the discussion of this bill, too much attention perhaps has been paid to the undoubted power of Congress to increase the number of justices, and hardly any consideration has been
given to its lack of power to interfere with their tenure during good
9. "The number of judges to be appointed would depend wholly on the decizion of
present judges now over 70 or those who would subsequently reach the age of 70.
"If, for instance, any one of the sla Justices of the Supreme Court now over the age
of 70 should retire as provided under the plan, no additional place would be created.
Consequently, although there never can be more than 15, there may be only 14, or 13,
or 12, and there may be only 9." "Fireside" talk of President Roosevelt, March 9, 1937,

reprinted in

CONGREssIoNAL RECORD,

Wednesday, March 10, 1937 at p. 2651.
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behavior. It is submitted that Congress may not do indirectly what it
cannot do directly.10 If Congress were to attempt to make the life tenure
-of justices so disagreeable and vexatious that any independent, honorable judge would be compelled as a practical matter in fairness to himself to retire or resign, I submit that such a measure would conflict
with the provisions of the judiciary article of the Constitution. Does
not the present proposal tend in that direction? Is the plan a constitutional attempt to "pack" the Court or is it possibly an unconstitutional
measure to "push" the older justices of the Supreme Court into retirement? Is the constitutional guarantee of life tenure to be deemed alone
invaded by an express enactment compelling a judge to retire at seventy?
May it not be accomplished also by an indirect and concealed program?
As evidence of the real objective of this plan, suppose the proponents
were asked two questions: "(1) Do you prefer to enlarge the Supreme
Court to fifteen members; or (2) Do you prefer to have six of the nine
justices now sitting retire?" There can be little doubt that the answer
would be that retirement was the preferred alternative.
Assume the passage of this bill and that the justices now sitting remain
on the bench. Bear in mind the background of personal attack which
runs through this controversy. The new appointments are made in order
to accomplish the desired "blood transfusion." Let us not consider
the feelings of a temperamental jurist, but rather those of a sensible,
normal, imperturbable judge over seventy. Can it be doubted that in
all reasonable probability he would seek retirement rather than a continuance of judicial service under such surroundings?
Let us make a comparison out of recent constitutional law. One of
the objectionable features of present day judicial construction up to the
recent decision in the Washington Minimum Wage case, was the claim
of alleged freedom of contract advanced by the so-called conservative
group of judges. From the Adkins case on the dissenting justices insisted that there is no true freedom or liberty where no real bargaining
power exists.
Is there not something of the same background developed in connection with the "liberty" of the justices of the Supreme Court to remain
on the bench after seventy if the present plan be adopted? This "liberty" it is submitted hardly can be said to be a real liberty, when the
position of the justices who remain on the bench after seventy, as a
practical matter is likely to become so uncomfortable and vexatious,
subjectively at least, as to impel them to retire. May there not be
"psychological" pressure as well as economic? The question I should
10. "It is an established principle that the attainment of a prohibited end may not
be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which are granted." United
States. V.,lButle'r, 297 U. S. 1, 6S (1935).
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like to submit to this Committee is whether such retirement can be said
to be voluntary in the real sense rather than the result of Congressional
enactment accomplished without constitutional amendment."
It seems therefore that if it be determined that there should be a
change of policy to limit the tenure of the justices by providing for their
retirement on reaching a designated age, the matter should be handled
as Dean Smith has suggested, by adopting an amendment to the judiciary
article rather than by the present bill. This would have the advantage,
as the Dean pointed out, of putting the issue before the people where
it properly belongs. If such an amendment be contemplated, the age
specified for compulsory retirement in my opinion should be seventy-five,
although voluntary retirement after seventy might be provided. Moreover, provision should be made for spacing the retirement of the present
justices who would be affected by such an amendment over a period of
several years to avoid the serious consequence of disruption of the Court
which otherwise would result. In addition, to prevent a repetition of
a proposal like the present one at some future time, the amendment
should set the number of justices composing the Supreme Court at the
permanent number of nine.
In conclusion let it be remembered that the country-wide interest in
the proposed plan to remake the Supreme Court is spontaneous and
non-partisan. The opposition to it is deep-rooted and bona fidc, and
springs from the realization by countless people throughout the nation
that the proposal reaches down to and shakes the foundations of
our constitutional structure. The strength and scope of this opposition
is something which should, and I am sure will, merit the careful consideration of this Committee.
11. In United States v. Butler, supra note 10, at 70, discussing the question of vhether
the AAA plan was voluntary or compulsory, the majority opinion, written up by justice
Roberts and concurred in by all but three of the justices, contained the following
language:
"The Government asserts that whatever might be said against the validity of the
plan if compulsory, it is constitutionally sound because the end is accomplhhed by
voluntary cooperation. There are two sufficient answers to the contention. The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the
price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The amount offered is intended to be sufildent to exert pressure on him to agree to the proposed regulation. The power to confer
or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower
elects not to accept the benefits, he will receive less for his crops; thosa who receive
payments will be able to undersell him. The result may well be financial ruin. The
coercive purpose and intent of the statute is not obscured by the fact that it has
not been perfectly successful."

